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Takeshi Kohno
Political Background of Islamic
Educational Institutions and the Reach of
the State in Southeast Asial
Abstrak: Lembaga pendidikan Islam senantiasa memainknn peran penting
bagi kehidupan keagamaan umat Muslim. Institusi ini menjadi medium
utama bagi terjadinyn proses transformasi keilmuan. Pemahaman mendalam
pnra kader muslim atas rngam pengetahuan keislaman-mulai dnri tafsir
Qur'an, hadis, hukum, teologi, bahasa dnn sastra Arab,logika, hingga ilmu
kesehatan-tak pelak mendapat tempat persemaiannya di ruang-ruang lem-
baga pendidikan lslam yang umumnya dikenal dengan sebutan madrasah
atau aesantren.
Namun, gnmbnran tersebut tidak sepenuhnya ideal jika melacak lebih
jauh kondisi dunia pendidikan di Asia Tenggara. Di wilayah yang dihuni
lebih dari 220 juta Muslim ini, yang tersebar di berbagai negara,lembaga
pendidikan Islam seringknli diasosiasiknn sebagai instutusi yang-selain
berperan menghnsilkan para aktiais lslam radiknl-juga terpenting turut
membantu pertumbuhan dan persebaran gerakan yang notnbene terkait erat
dengan terorisme di dunia Islam tersebut.
Dengan dalih mendirikan negara Islam, bnnynk di antara para pemim-
pin kelompok militnn-di Asia Tenggara dikenal antara lain Laskar lihad,
Kumpulan Muj ahidin Malaysia, ataupun I emmah lslamiy ah-rnendiriknn
sekolah-sekolah Islam, madrasah atnu pesantren, guna melqkuknn rekruitmen
kader, pr op aganda, serta utamany a melancnrkan doktrinisasi kep er cay aan
bagi para knder muslim yang dalam bebernpa kasus tak jarang dipengaruhi
oleh kedekatan mereka dengan kelompok nl-Qaeda.
Menarik dicatat adalah bahwa terkadang lembaga-Iem.baga yang merekn
diriknn samn sekali lEas dari pengawasan Pemerintah pusat. Di Indonesin
misalnya, dari 37,352 madrasah yang ada, hanya 3,226 (8.5%) yang tercntat
dikelola langsung oleh Negara. Demikian puln di Filipina. Di wilayah berpo-
pulasi 75 juta jiwa ini, hanya 35 dari 1,600 sekolah Islam yang dikontrol oleh
'1.91 Studia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009
192 Takeshi Kohno
Negara. Tidak hanya itu, dalam beberapn kasus, pesantren yang didirikan
tersebut diorientasiknn berjarak dengan otoritas Negara. Inilah yang dipe-
rankan antara lain oleh Pesantren Al-Mukmin, Solo,lawa Tengah. Pondok
Pesantren yang didirikan Abu Baknr Ba'asyir dan Abdullah Sungkar ini
dit engar ai selalu b erup ay a memb eriknn nj ar an-aj ar an y ang bert entangan
dengan beragam kebij aknn P emerintah.
Padahal, guna mengurangi gelombang terorisme, Negarn pada giliran-
nya harus memberikan perhatinn khusus bagi lembaga-lembaga pendidikan
tersebut. Kasus di Filipina dan Thailnnd Selatan misalnya, menunjukan bah-
wa beragam kebijaknn Pemerintah tentang pendidikan seringkali mnsih dici-
rikan dengan tidak adanya dukungan penuh dari masyarakat muslim. Kedua
daerah minoritas muslim tersebut cenderung melihat lembaga pendidikan
lslam sebagai benteng utama bngi terjaganya identitas keislaman mereka.
Sementara di sisi lain, pihak Pemerintah yang notabene merupnkan golong'
an non-Muslim, cenderung memperlnkukan lembaga-lembaga tersebut tidak
ndil dan kurang proporsional. Hasilnya, baik madrasah di Filipina (Madaris)
atnupun di Thailand Selatan (Pondok) sangat menjagn pranata kehidupan
pendidiknnnya. HaI itu setidaknya tampak dari keseriusan mereka menjaga
muatan kurikulum keagamaan sekolah dari kebijnknn kurikulum pemerintnh
ynng sekuler.
Latar belakang itulah yang menjadi titik pijak artikel ini. Dengan
menjadiknn Indonesia sebagai salah satu fokus penelitian, ia berupaya
mene g askan b ahw a kunci ut ama mel akuknn tr an sformasi I emb a g n p en didiknn
Islam, terkhusus di AsiaTenggnra, harus diselaraskan dengan upaya Negara
dalam melakukan pengawasan atas dunia pendidikan. Karenanya, selain
berupaya memberiknn latar balaknng politik, dalam konteks relasi negara
dan masynrakat atas keberndaan lembaga pendidiknn Islam tersebut, artikel
ini juga berusaha mengungkap respon umum masyaraknt terhadap langknh
negara yang melakuknn pengawasan atas dunia pendidiknn-mulai dari
perumusan dan pengimplementasian kurikulum, perbaikan manajemen
sekolah,hinggaprogrampelibatan sekolah-sekolahtersebutke dalamkerangkn
state-buidin g secara umum.
Dengan terlebih dahulu mengambil pijaknn dari kecenderungan ideologis
masy araknt y ang terdikotomi pada empat spektrum-tradisionalis, modernis,
fundamentalis , dan jihadis-lenulis meyakini bahrna sekolah yang cenderung
berkarakter modernis pada gilirannyn aknn lebih mampu menindi mitra negara
dalam rangka melakuknn beragnm perubahan, utnmanyn memproduksi para
pemimpin nasional yang turut mempengnruhi kebijakan negara, termasuk
memerangi terorisme, Lebih jauh, sekolah-sekolah modernis seperti sekolah
Muhammadiyah, Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor, Ponorogo, lawa
Timur, atau Pondok Pesantren Diniyah Putri Padang Panjang, Sumatera
Barat; semuanya telah mampu berpernn sebagai motor penggerak bagi
terciptany a proses pembangunan nasional.
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Introduction
slam and education are tightly connected, and trying to separate
one from the other makes both meaningless. Islam historicahy
is committed to activities of propagation (da'rnah) and acquiring
mic knowledge ('ilm). For Muslims, educational institutions are
medium for the transmissionof ilmu.
Islamic knowledge covers a wide variety of disciplines, such as
Qur'anic exegesis, Hadith,law, theology, Arabic language and po-
etry, literature, logic, and medicine. This wide range of knowledge
is consistent with the character of Islam which envisions a compre-
hensive world view unified under God. The transmission of this
knowledge takes place mainly via person-to-person interaction, and
the location of transmission is the Islamic educational institution.
popularly called the madrasah.
Unfortunately, Islamic educational institutions in Southeast Asia
are increasingly being viewed as a source of Islamic radicalism.
According to Zachy "\buza,Islamic educational institutions are a
product of Islamic radicalism, and used as a recruiting ground for
new, radical members:
In their pursuit of the creation of an Islamic state, many Southeast Asianjihadis established Islamic schools to indoctrinate, propagate, and
recruit. The leaders of many militant groups in Southeast Asia, including
Laskar Jihad, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, and ]emmah Islamiya,
returned from Afghanistan and established a network of madrasahs
as the base of their operations and recruitment. And madrasahs are
increasingly beyond state control. Of the 37,362 madrasahs in Indonesia,
only 3,226 (8.6%) are run by the state; and 81'k percent of the 5.6 million
students enrolled in madrasah attend privately funded and run Islamic
schools. ln the Philippines only thirty five of the 1,600 are controlled by
the state, with alarming consequences. As one education official put it,
the privately funded madrasahs'tailor their curricula to the wishes of
whoever subsidizes them'... There is now a critical mass of students
studying in Islamic universities and madrasahs who are reinforced in
their conviction that Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao must become
Islamic states in order to overcome the myriad socioeconomic and
political woes that secularism has wrought.l
In a similar line of argument an American journalist Maria Ressa,
former Cable News Network (CNN) Manila correspondent turned
media executive in the Philippines, provides a chilling picture of
Islamic educational institutions as a part of the Al-Qaeda network:
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...all that is exactly what al-Qaeda creates in its global network: from the
schools known as pesantrens and madrasahs, which begin to train young
minds of four or five years olds, to the training camps hidden around
the world, to the terrorist cells that carry out its plots.2
The contrast between religious radicalism and terrorism with
that of education, which seeks to turn innocent children into social-
ly responsible adults is so stark that it begs for an accurate analysis
of madrasahs and other Islamic educational institutions in Southeast
Asia.
One pesantren, called Pesantren Al-Mukmin in the city of Solo in
Central Java, Indonesia, is seriously caught between these acutely
contrasting images. The school's two founding fathers Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar are mentioned as spiritual
leaders repeatedly by a number of radical Muslims including those
arrested for bombing campaigns in Southeast Asia. The school's
thousands of pupils are obviously not terrorists, and to delete the
negative image, the school's management even invited foreign em-
bassy officials in Indonesia to the school to hold dialogue.3 Atho
Mudzhar, who heads the research centre and development of
Indonesia's Ministry of Religion, asserted that one could not gener-
alize the ideology of Islamic schools based on a few radical schools.a
In an effort to respond to foreign suspicion of the school, the same
Ministry conducted in 2003 a study to examine the extent of radical-
ism in the Al-Mukmin school, but the study found no evidence that
the school taught terrorism.s
This paper asserts that examiningmadrasnhs in the context of "the
war on terro{'point of view misses the real undercurrent of social
transformation that is currently going on in educational institutions
in Southeast Asia: the battle for control of education between the
state and society. It also claims that this battle, which is not unusual
in the process of nation-state building in post-colonial states, has a
renewed meaning because of the age of the war on terror. In other
words, the key assertion is that the current transformation of Islamic
schools in Southeast Asia should be viewed within the context of
the state-building process, or the state's attempts to control Islamic
education. What's more is that the "the war on terror" is being treat-
ed as an opportunity by both sides to take control of the educational
transformation processes. The significance of "the war on tetrot"
variable is overblown in describing Islamic education institutions
just as Abuza and Ressa did. The author believes that the impact of
the war on terror is still yet to be seen clearly in a uniformed man-
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ner, and furthermore, it is difficult to assess the impact of only the
war on terror, given the variable cannot be easily separated from
other variables of locally specific conditions.
Therefore, this paper first provides the political background of
the existing Islamic educational institutions in southeast Asia with-
in the context of state-society relations in order to better understand
the complex nature of their existence. The proposed approach,
which explains the political background of Islamic educational in-
stitutions, starts from a typology of four overlapping Islamic groups
based on different world views: traditionalist, modernist, funda-
mentalist, and jihadis. Through this typology, this paper proposes
that different groups have different responses to the state's attempts
to reach out for more control.
The state control is measured by the following aspects. The first
aspect is the degree by which the state defines and implements the
school curriculum. The second aspect is that the degree by which
the state controls the management and finance. Both management
and finance are inseparable as one who controls finances controls
management including personnel, and vice versa. Then, by placing
the school types with this proposed typology, this paper speculates
the responses of the Islamic educational institutions to the state's
attempt to control education.
It is difficult, however, to have a grand overview of areas as di-
verse as southeast Asia. Therefore, this paper examines the political
conditions of educational policies of Indonesia as a case study in
order to highlight the position Islamic educational institutions hold
in the Muslim majority yet ethnically dlverse state of Indonesia.
Indonesia is chosen for the following reasons. First,Indonesia holds
by far the largest number of Muslims and Islamic educational in-
stitutions among Southeast Asian countries. Second, Indonesia has
been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks that started in\999, and as a
result Islamic educational institutions are now under intense scru-
tiny. Third, I argue that Indonesia's current condition and the fu-
ture of its Islamic educational institutions influence the conditions
of neighbouring countries. By doing this, I hope to shed light on
a significant trend in implementing Islamic educational policies,
and later speculate on the conditions of Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines.
I argue in the concluding section that the modernist schools are
the most likely group to come closest to the state's education agen-
da among Muslim groups due to their ideological orientation and
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management capability. Due to this closeness to the state, the mod-
ernist schools deserve sPecial attention ds they are producing the
national leaders that most influence the policy options of the state in
times of national crises such as terrorist attacks and war'
Southeast Asian Muslims
We first need to look at the Southeast Asian Muslim societies.
The number of Muslims in Southeast Asia is estimated to be more
than220 million and growing. This is at least one-fifth of the world's
Muslim population, and more than the Arab Muslim population.
Indonesia has by far the largest number, about 200 million Muslims,
followed by Malaysia's 14 million, the Philippines' 4'3 million,
Thailand's 3 million, Myanmar's 1.7 million, Cambodia's 700,000,
Singapore's 660,000, and Brunei's 300,000. Laos and Vietnam also
have small Muslim populations. Of these countries, Muslims in
Indonesia and Malaysia constitute the majority, whereas.Muslims
in the other countries mentioned are minorities.
Southeast Asian Muslim Population
Total
Population
Muslim
Population
Majority/
Minoritv
Muslim's Geographic
Concentration
lndonesia 230 million 200 million Dominant majority (86%)
Everywhere but less densely in
the east
Malaysia 24 million 14 million Majority (58%)
Everywhere but less
densely in the east
Philippines 76 million 4.3 million Small Minority (5%)
Densely in Western Mindanao,
Manila
Thailand 61 million 3 million Small Minority (5%)
Densely in the south,
Banqkok
Myanmar 49 million 1.7 million Small Minority (3%) Densely in the west
Cambodia 12 million 0.7 million Small Minority (5%)
Ethnic Cham, mostly in
the South
Singapore 4 million 0.66 million Small Minority (15%)
Everywhere, a few
pockets in city state
Brunei 0.4 million 0.3 million Dominant Majority (75%) Everywhere
The distinction between majority Muslims and minority Muslims
is important as this distinction produces different educational poli-
cies. As might be expected, the majority groups get better politi-
cal representation and in turn get greater political Power. There
are of course exceptions, such as colonial rule or colonial-like rule
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as seen in Apartheid south Africa. For Islamic educational institu-
tions in southeast Asia, this naturally means that in countries where
Muslims constitute a majority, lhe madrasafo, the most common form
of Islamic educational institution, will receive considerable sup-
port from the government, as is the case in Brunei, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. on the contrary, the Muslim minorities in the philippines,
Thailand and other states in southeast Asia are pushed urid" (ot
simply ignored) in almost all policy areas of gorr"irr*"r,t including
policies related to the madrasah/Islamic education.
In addition, when there is a geographical concentration of
Musiims in these countries (i.e. those where Muslims are the minor-
ity), the impact of this isolation on their day-to-day lives is mostly
negative and often severe. The cases of the philippines and rhailand,
for example, show that the state educational policy toward madrasah
education is characterizedby suspicion of the Muslims and thus a
reluctance to support these educational institutions.
The Case of Indonesia
The current Indonesian state is a product of colonialism, and
its population is a mix of various religious and ethnic groups.
Although Muslims are by far the dominant majority, minority
groups are quite large in number, and cannot be ignored. For ex_
ample, the Chinese Indonesians (whose religious belief is rarely
Islam) number around 6 million or more, easily outnumbering the
total population of predominantly-Chinese singapore. This reality
of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population that is mixed with
dominant Muslims and also an indispensable number of minority
groups guided Indonesia's course of state building along a secular
route. Indonesia's official state ideology the pancasila that displays
no preference for any religious or ethnic group is a testimony to this
reality.
The domination of Dutch colonial authority in the earrv 20th cen-
tury increasingly imposed a centralized administrative system, and
begun imposing regulation control such as licensing and curriculum
on indigenous schooling. In responding to the colonial control of in-
digenous schooling, the Islamic leaders, who were hard pressed to
provide quality education apart from colonial schools to their chil-
dren, established madrasahs and Islamic schools as a way to provide
Muslim children with a modern education with Isramic ideals. The
leaders who established madrasahs were influenced by the Islamic
Studia Islamika, VoI. 16, No. 2, 2009
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modernist thinking of the late 19th century in the Middle East, and
one representativsof this group in Indonesia is Muhammadiyah'6
col,onial control increased the existing tensionbetween the Dutch
and Islamic groups, and this tension eventually converged into the
struggle for independence. The role of madrasahs and Islamic semi-
nari6s calle d.pesintren during the independence struggle is well de-
scribed by many, as these schools led the independence movement
against the colonial power.T This was also the time when leaders
sJch as Islamic leadlr Muhammad Natsir and nationalist leader
sukarno worked together to win independence. However, the join-
ing of Islam and nationalism at the time of the independence strug-
gle diverged quickly once independence was won'
" Indonesia,i education system also showed a similarly dichoto-
mous character between nationalist and Islamic camps after in-
dependence. Along with the state established secular schools un-
der the Ministry o] Education (currently the Ministry of National
Education), theie existed a mostly privately-owned madrasah sys-
tem under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
Meanwhile, there were large numbers of Islamic pesantrens, the
existence of which appears to go back many centuries. Pesantren',s
characteristics consist bf a charismatic owner/Islamic teacher called
Kyai, the students called santri (who often board at the school), and
tie study of classical texts typically used in Java called Kitnb Kuning.
The pesintren is more than an Islamic boarding school - it is a com-
munity of Muslims with a mosque, dormitories, and classlooms
being at the center in the property, and deeply embedded in the
locaicommunity. These three systems, the state secular school, the
madrasah,and the pesantren, still exist side by side in the Indonesian
education system.
The overlap of the madrasah and pesantren has become increas-
ingly blurred in recent times. According to Rahardjo, the madrasah
,yitl* (graded and day-school modelled on the Dutch school sys-
tem in tr," I.rdotr"rian Muslim context) of teaching Islam was intro-
duced to pesantrens in1929 by Moh. Ilyas and later spread to other
pesantrens.s ln a typical form, a pesantren establishes amadrasah on
the central location of the property by formalizing the seminary into
a graded day-school in order to attract more non-boarding children
in_surrounding communities. Another possibility is that apesantren
establishes a madrasah by creating an after-school course for chil
dren who, during the day, go to state secular school'
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Reach of the State
The state policy toward Islamic education reflects the fact that
the state cannot ignore the Islamic curriculum because Muslims
are the dominant majority. During the secular Sukarno regime, the
state's policy had at least three strategies: to insert Islamic subjects
into the secular state school curriculum, to insert secular subjects
into the madrasah curriculum, and finally to train Islamic teachers
from the newly established Religious Teacher's Colleges (Sekolah
Pendidikan Guru Agama). This three-tier strategy did not go far
enough to integrate the madrasah under the state control. It was dur-
ing the Sukarno years also that madrasah management was placed
under the umbrella of Ministry of Religious Affairs. The position
of minister for the Ministry was generally always ,"r"rrr"d fo, u
Muslim cleric and therefore the Islamic educational institutions
were able to use the Ministry to protect madrasah interests.
The political turn came inI966 when General Soeharto took over
as President; it was Soeharto who further accelerated state con-
trol of Islamic education. Th 1972 and 1974 presidential instruc-
tions (Keppres No. 34/1972 and Keppres No. 1S/I974) to move
madrasah management from the Religious ministry's supervision
to the Education and Culture Ministry's supervision was seen by
Muslim leaders as a major setback for their political strength. The
appointment of the new Religious Affairs Minister Mukti Ali, an
academic non-cleric, also reflected soeharto's push for secular state-
buildinge. This was the first time that the largest Muslim organiza-
tion, Nahdlatul Ulama, failed to capture the position of minister.
Although the subsequent protest by Muslim groups led to the re-
turn of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as the supervising agency
in1975, the state in return succeeded in imposing a70% secular sub-
jects/3}% Islamic subjects rule in the madrasah curriculum in order
for graduates to be qualified for admission to tertiary institutions in
secular subiects.
Madrnsahs grew also in their numbers as state penetration suc-
ceeded. At the elementary school level, called madrasah ibtidaiyah,
the number of school establishments grew from 13,000 schools in
the mid-1960s to 21,300 in the 1989 /90 academic year, and to 34,800
in the 1996 /97 academic year.1o The number of pupils also grew sig-
nificantly: from 1.9 million elementary lever madrasah school chil-
dren in the mid-1960s to 4.3 million children in the same grade level
in 1996/97. The 1989 education law also required the madrasahs to
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participate in a government Plan to make the first nine years of edu-
cation compulsory.
The reach of the state also extended to the pesantrens.The pesant'
rens ate,as mentioned earlier, typically owned by a landlord/Islamic
teacher called alcyai. Although the curriculum is determined by the
pesantren, some 4,284 pesantren (which are by the Religious Affairs
Ministry categorized as "comprehensive fterpadu)") generally adopt
lhe madrasalz curriculum with 70"h secular /30% Islamic subjects.ll
Out of the total number of 14,361' pesantrens (2004 figure), a vast ma-
jorrty (1.1.,664 establishments) are located in ]ava and mostly located
in rural areas.l2 This remoteness, however, makes pesantrens unique
in the sense that they are able to operate away from mainstream
national policy.
As described above, the government control of Islamic educa-
tion started with the standardization of the madrasah curriculum,
and this curriculum which was mixed with secular subjects was ad-
opted by the pesantren. After having been recognized as part of the 9
year compulsory system inI9B9, apesantren according to a national
education law passed in 2003 was also recognized clearly as part of
the national education system, and this made the pesantren eligible
for financial support from the state as well as subject to control in
terms of education quality and curriculum.
Thus, as described earlier, there are three different educational
systems: secular government schools, madrasahs, and pesantrens.
Today it is clear that the reach of the state is extending to Islamic
schools, both madrasahs and pesantrens, albeit slowly' What should
also be noted is that the war on terror has had some impact on the
reach of the state with regards to Islamic educational institutions.
How is this so? Below I will present a typology of Islamic society
that describes the different types of Islamic schools in order to show
the possible impact of the war on terror on Islamic educational in-
stitutions in the context of the reach of the state'
Typologies of Islamic Society
Presented below is a conceptual picture of what Islamic society
may look like based on the ideological tendencies. This typology
determined by each grouping's interpretation of Islamic principles
(i.e. Flexible or rigid) and how these groups go about implementing
or achieving their ideals. There are four Vpes, namely traditional-
ists, modernists, fundamentalists, and iihadiss.
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Traditionalists tend to blend well with local (often rural) social
conditions. Traditionalist leaders are often local social leaders,land-
Iords, and in the case of Indonesia, particularly in java, the own-
ers of property on which a pesantren is run. In addition to the local
landlords who are Islamic teachers, the vast majority in this type
are ordinary farmers, shop keepers, and those who receive Islamic
teaching from local religious teachers and send their children to
Islamic schools. Such children are often susceptible to the preacher's
interpretation of Islam, for he holds a monopoly of sorts over what
the students learn. In the Indonesian context, Nahdlatul Ulama is
representative of this group. Nominal Muslims who do not belong
to any Muslim groups, generally categorized as "nationalists", also
belong to the traditionalist grouping.
The second group is the modernists who mostly view their role
in society as the engine of nation-building. They are ambitious in
their leadership outlook. This view is consistent with the early 20th
century Middle Eastern modernists from which this term is taken.
This group looks at the fate of Muslim fellows overseas from the
point of view of national leadership. For example, they are very
willing to capture state power, and feel that they should be edu-
cated in science and technology so that their state can compete
against the advanced states. They run advanced educational insti-
tutions which give instructions in both Islam and secular subjects
such as math and the sciences. In Indonesia, a representative of this
group is Muhammadiyah, a loosely organizedMuslim organization
with millions of members and a vast network of modern madrasah
schools. In addition to the vast number of madrasqlrs that carry the
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Muhammadiyah banner all over Indonesia, there are 36 compre-
hensive Muhammadiyah universities , and 126 colleges which offer
majors in subjects such as accounting, economics, and nursing.lt In
other words, this group, compared to the traditionalist group, con-
stitutes the opinion makers and their comments and expressions are
very important in structuring the streams of public opinion.
The third type is the fundamentalists who are concerned with
a scriptural, not substantial, interpretation and implementation of
the precepts of Islam. The fundamentalist groups are not necessar-
ily radical in action. Some of them are very moderate in action, or
it may be more accurate to say that their action is inward-looking
as far as social change is concerned. Their ideal form of polity is an
Islamic state although there are different versions of it. They firmly
believe that modern social decay is the result of the secularization
led by the West. Many are concerned with the events in the lives of
fellow Muslims and their lives in Palestine, Chechnya, andKashmir.
Thus, they do not pay much attention to whtrt is happening in their
local communities where they live.
Finally, the term jihadis refers to those who resort to violence in
order to achieve their extreme views of social change. This group is
tiny in number but gains the most attention due to their acts of vio-
lence. Some, but not all, leaders in this category have had overseas
war experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the Philippines
(Mindanao) in their youth, making them probably the youngest
group of all. They reject the current form of democratic nation-
states because they seek to establish an Islamic state, and thus do
not participate in representative democracy by running for office.
Most of them flatly reject cultural traits unique to a particular locale
in Islamic social development in Southeast Asia. For them, Islam
is entirely universal in both value and form, and transcends any
diversity of different social characteristics.
The ]ihadiss do not admire great Islamic civilizations in the past,
such as the Sufi tradition in Bukhara, or the great empires of the
Ottoman and the Mughal under Akbar, but instead fantasize about
the purity of Islamic life during the initial period of Islamic civili-
zation in the Arabian Peninsula. They strongly despise what they
perceive as the corrupt influence of the West, such as moral decay'
corruption, and drugs. They feel that their world dlr al-Islam or
"house (world) of peace" is constantly under attack by dar al-harb
or "house (world) of wa{' led by aggressive non-Muslims, particu-
larly the United States. This view sees the world divided into good
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and evil. This dichotomous view of the world is so embedded in
their thoughts that they fail to see the intricacies and characteristics
of local uniqueness which improvises and enriches Islamic teaching
within Southeast Asia.
The Typology Applied to Indonesian lslamic Education
Institutions
Now let me apply this typology to Islamic schools in Indonesia
as a case in point. First, the traditionalist schools are, as mentioned
above, those affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama boarding schools
(pesantrens), and other pesantrens in rural Indonesia. For example,
Nahdlatul Watan on the island of Lombok, and Persatuan Umaat
Islam are found in this category. The leaders see the rural society
where they reside as the priority, and often the owners of pesantren
(lcyai) are members of local assemblies. This trend became much
more obvious when during the 2004 elections these local leaders
emerged as key persons in voter mobilization. The management of
the pesantrerz is largely carried out by the kyai and his family mem-
bers, and the leadership position of the kyai is hereditary.
Financial matters, such as the salaries for teachers, are not well
defined, and the balance sheet if there is one, and other financial
records are not open to the public. The income for the school comes
mostly from fees paid by students, with some side income from lo-
cal contributions, sales from kiosk shops, and selling agricultural
produce. This reliance on tuition fees, as it is hardly enough for en-
suring low teacher-student ratio, is probably the main reason for
the very large class sizes. The curriculum is heavy on Ktsb Kuning
or traditional Islamic texts, and the method of teaching is mainly
the memorization of texts. However, some large pesantrens in this
category, for example Pesantren Darul Ulum in Jombang, East Java,
adopt secular subjects as part of the curriculum in order to give stu-
dents an opportunity for obtaining higher degrees in secular sub-
jects in universities.
The second category of modernist schools is, as mentioned above,
exemplified by Muhammadiyah schools. The leadership of these
schools has a nationalist world view with the ambition to produce
national leaders. Many schools are located in urban centres in re-
gional cities and the school management and organrzation departs
from the hereditary system common in traditionalist schools. The
curriculum is heavy in Islamic subjects and natural sciences, and of-
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ten they require students to do volunteer work as part of their civic
education. This demonstrates that the modernist schools see social
participation as an important element in the kind of education they
provide. It must be mentioned however, that there are number of
independent schools in this category which do not belong to any of
the major Muslim groups in Indonesia. The giant in this independ-
ent modernist category is Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor in
Ponorogo, East Java. Gontor, known for its competitive quality, is a
huge boarding school with 6,000 students from junior highs school
to college. Gontor is famous because it produced prominent alum-
ni, such as the current speaker of the upper house assembly (MPR)
Hidayat Nur Wahid, probably the most prolific liberai Islamic
scholar, the late Nurcholish Madjid, and the radical preacher Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir. Another school in this category known for produc-
ing national leaders is the first madrnsah solely for female students.
Pondok Pesantren Diniyah Putri in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra,
was established in 1923 and the curriculum is heavily concentrated
in science and Islam.
'The third category, fundamentalist schools, includes those schools
with a heavy emphasis on Islamic principles, action and form, and
tend to train students to become preachers ('ulamd') and Islamic
teachers (ustadh). The leadership in this category is acutely aware
of Muslim affairs around the world and is committed to creating an
Islamic community through the implementation of Islamic law. One
example of this category is Pesantren Hidayatullah in Balikpapan,
East Kalimantan. TI'is pesantren administratively adopts the curric-
ulum designed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which consists
of both secular and Islamic subjects but has a training program of
propagation after school hours.la Students are also encouraged to
follow the principles of the life of the Prophet and asked to estab-
lish branches of Hidayatullah School after graduation. As a result,
there are about 140 branches of Hidayatullah pesnntrens located in
all over Indonesia. The school is also known to have mass marriages
sponsored by the pesantren}s Two other examples in this category
are Pesantren Al-Zaitun in Indramayu, West Java, and Pesantren AI-
Mukmin in Solo, Central ]ava.
The final category is the jihadis schools. This group is difficult
to sort out because the students studying in "jihadis schools" as
such are obviously not all jihadiss. The difficulty of assessing this
group may come from the fact that the school education does not
result in a uniform outcome for all graduates. This is the nature of
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an educational system where input (education) does not translate
into the same output (quality of graduates), and conversely it is un-
fair to label a whole school based on a few graduates. Yet, it is safe
to say that this group is, conceptually, part of the fundamentalist
group: the distinguishing factor is the violence resorted to by some
members of this category in order to achieve their goals. Thus, un-
Iess there is a specific instruction for direct and violent action in the
name of Islam within the school environment, it is hard to list any
schools in this category. One may be tempted to put the above-men-
tioned Pesantren Al-Mukmin, with many graduates having been
members of the Jemaah Islamiyyah (ji) group, in this category. The
same might be said of Pesantren Al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java,
since some of the school leaders confessed to involvement in the
2002 deadly Bali bombings.
However, a check of the backgrounds of the perpetrators' of
numerous bombings in Southeast Asia shows different affiliations
and do not point to pesantrens as the problem: members of jihadis
movements such as the Abu Sayyaf Croup in the Philippines and
Kompak in Indonesia, and others from JI do not have the same edu-
cational background. Furthermore, some Malaysians detained or
sought so far have university degrees in secular subjects and lack
a solid Islamic education.l6 Some key Indonesian jihadiss are also
graduates of state madrasahs.lT
Now that descriptions of the schools along with the ideological
typologies have been explained, it is time for us to assess the reach of
the state based on these typologies. I asserted that education needs
to be understood in the context of state-building, and view the cur-
rent war on terror as an opportunity for the state to reach out to the
Islamic education sector. The reach of the state as a result of the 2003
National Education System Law requires much more detailed study
than this paper, but based on the typology, it is possible to speculate
on the reach of the state.
Speculating the reach of the state
The state's reach into Islamic education depends on the degree
with which the state embodies Islamic principles, the state's fund-
ing availability, and the responses from the educational institutions.
The social responses are dynamic and may be both positive and neg-
ative responses depending on the circumstances and perceptions of
the leaders of the educational institutions. In the Indonesian case.
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many of the madrasah anLd pesantren are privately owned, and tlehe
degree to which individuals have control over schools differs from
school to school. It appears to be that the traditionalist and funda-
mentalist schools are more controlled by individuals than modern-
ist schools, and this may be a critical factor as to whether the state
can reach out.
The Indonesian state, with its secular character has avoided
"Islamization". The fall from power of Soeharto in1998, however,
led to unprecedented political freedoms for Muslims and Islamic
political parties have captured more than 30% of parliamentary
seats in subsequent elections. As the Indonesian state has not had a
policy of Islamizing the state school system, it is safe to say that so
far the reach of the state aims at controlling the Islamic education
under a secular state.
As far as the state's reach in Islamic education is concerned, most
of the 34,000 madrasahs and1,4,000 pesantrens at the elementary school
level (with about 6-7 million pupils) are private establishments and
receives little financial support from the state. The curriculum is set
by the state as 70"/" secular/30"hIslamic subjects in a formal sense,
but the actual implementation and enforcement mechanism does
not exist. The market availability for graduates probably gives in-
centives to Islamic schools to include secular subjects.
With this background, let us consider the susceptibility to the
reach of the Indonesian state by examining the circumstances of the
school typologies. Here,I consider the above mentioned three major
types (traditionalist, modernist, and fundamentalist schools) from
two viewpoints: management and ideology. The jihadis is treated as
insignificant in this overview paper although it does deserve atten-
tion as they are the loudest group in the time of violence.
First, let us consider management. The traditionalist schools are
in a difficult position because they are sandwiched by the lure of the
state funds while facing the threat of losing private control over the
school. Pesnntren leadership is strictly based on a hereditary system,
and the legitimacy of the hereditary system comes fuom the lcyai's
Islamic credentials. Introducing more secular subjects will likely
erode thelcyai/owner's power since it is secular as well as Islamic
knowledge that is critical to the student's education. Thus the kyai
will either be forced to share power with those who possess and can
teach this secular knowledge, or the kyai wiII need to attain this sec-
ular knowledge himself. A modernized curriculum that includes, in
particular, natural science courses requires more funding for new
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facilities and experimental laboratories, and the pressure for new
funding for these facilities forces the management to look for state
subsidies
contrary to the problems facing traditional schools, the modern-
ist schools are under much less pressure in the areas of manage-
ment because they already have a modern management structure
and budgeting system. For example, the salary structure for both
teachers and office staff is well defined, and schools like pesantren
contor have an executive management office supervised by an ad-
visory board.
Although the inner workings of the fundamentarist schools are
not clear, they probably have similar problems to the traditionalist
schools. The management structure is not well defined in the line
of modern school structure because of the dominance of a charis-
matic leader. The inclination for the inclusion of secular subjects is
less, compared to those of the traditionalist and modernist schools
because of the heavy emphasis on Islamic subjects. Financially, the
above-mentioned school Pesantren Hidayatullah may be doing well
due to the income from small scale businesr", ur,J contributions
from the public, but it is safe to assume most of the schools in this
category are not financially well-off. There is, however, an extreme
exception: the above-mentioned Pesantren Al-Zaitun has a huge
campus with first class facilities, although the source of the income
has never been disclosed by the school.
In terms of ideological orientation, the traditionalist and mod-
ernist schools have no hesitation to adopt a secular curriculum al-
though the modernists tend to put heavier emphasis on natural sci-
ences than traditionalist schools. The fundamentalists, on the other
hand, are hesitant to depart from the Islamic curriculum. This canbe
seen from their efforts to provide organized propagation activities
and recitation activities outside of the regular curriculum. After all,
many of these schools are boarding schools where spare times after
classes are used depending on the decisions of the reider. what dis-
tinguishes the modernist schools from the traditionalist schools is
that the modernist schools are more ambitious in educating national
leadership while the traditionalist school graduates tend io remain
in the local community, and clearly lag behind in fostering national
leaders. In this sense, the modernist schools are more susceptible
to state control, or, it might be more appropriate to say thai they
aim to capture state power through education. In fact, the modern-
ist schools have demonstrated their remarkable competence in ad-
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justing their curriculum to the state's agenda, and have fostered the
education of many national leaders.le
Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide a maP of Islamic schools based on
a typology of Islamic groups, and speculated as to how these schools
may be susceptible to the state's reach for further control. Indonesia
was chosen as a case study because not only does Indonesia have
'by far the largest numbers of Islamic schools in Southeast Asia, but
it also is a Muslim majority society with large numbers of religious
and ethnic minorities. This paper asserts that the modernist schools
are the most likely group to come closest to Indonesia's state educa-
tion agenda compared to other grouPs due to its ideological orienta-
tion and world view, and management style. What is missing from
this paper, however, is an explanation of why modernist schools do
not fall into more radical Islamic educational agendas' One reason
may be that the modernists are politically ambitious and find the
secular nature of Indonesia as politically more viable than further
Islamization. Or, it may be that the wave of Islamization may yet
still come if social uncertainty continues.
To consider the future of Islamic education/ we may examine
briefly the cases of Malaysia, South Thailand and the Philippines.
Malaysia is also a Muslim majority state and a creation of colo-
nialism just like Indonesia. The Muslim majority have held politi-
cal power since Malaysia's independence from the British and the
Government has always maintained control over the Islamic schools.
But the Malaysian case exhibits much deeper and extensive state
control over the Islamic school system due a much smaller number
of schools in comparison to Indonesia. What is also different about
the Malaysia case is the government's inclination for Islamization
for electoral purposes; the governing coalition Islamized itself in an
effort to claim Islamic legitimacy over the opposition Islamic Party.
Meanwhile, Muslim minority states such as Thailand and the
Philippines have paid little attention to the Islamic schools. The mi-
nority Muslims tend to see Islamic education as a medium to pre-
serve their Islamic identity under non-Muslim domination. This
view is similar to Indonesia's fundamentalist schools where they
do not see the current secular government of Indonesia accommo-
dating their Islamic aspirations. Hence Indonesia's fundamentalist
groups are not dissimilar to Muslim minorities in South Thailand
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and the Philippines in this respect. This may be the very reason for
the acute insistence to preserve Islamic subjects in schools of these
states because Islamic subjects are the foundation of their identity.
As a result, Muslim minorities have strengthened their madrasah (in
the Philippines called Madaris, and in South Thailand called Pondok)
on their own by adding Islamic studies to the curriculum at the ex-
pense of secular subjects.
Some graduates from the Philippines and Thai madrasahs have
sought an overseas education in Pakistan and Middle East for high-
er degrees in an effort to preserve their Islamic identity. Muslims
in Mindanao, for example, in the 1950s travelled to Cairo, Medina,
Riyadh, and Tripoli for tertiary education. This was not a neces-
sity for many Indonesians since study opportunities in state-funded
Islamic universities were plentiful.2o Many Thai Muslims (in the
case of Yawi speakers) still send their children to pondok rather than
state schools.2l Under these social conditions, the reach of the state
into the Islamic educational institutions is much weaker in Thailand
and the Philippines than in Malaysia and Indonesia.
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